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1. INTRODUCTION 
Redistribution targets have provided the main rationale for the 
growth in public spending in recent years . From 1975 to 199 1 ,  the 
redistribution of income and wealth accounted for 60% of the increase in 
total non-interest government expenditure. However, public spending, 
despite its positive effects, is not a free good to society. Poverty relief , 
state pension funds and unemployment benefits contain two elements of 
cost. The first is associated with the diversion of resources from directly 
productive private uses. The second arises from government 
intervention, which tends to upset price signals and, consequently, 
efficiency in the allocation of resources . It is difficult to evaluate such 
costs,  although there is some evidence of a negative correlation between 
public sector size and economic growth (for example, Grossman (1988); 
Grier and Tullock (1989 ) ) . As far as Spain is concerned, the empirical 
evidence pthered in Raymond (1992) shows that the expansion in current 
public expenditure explains nearly one quarter of the deceleration in GDP 
growth in the periods 1960-1974 and 1975-1991. 
Several factors can account for this negative relationship and, 
among them , an inadequate government spending structure can be singled 
out . In Spain, the size of public spending assigned to social capital 
-especially infrastructure investment- has traditionally been smalL The 
relationship between public infrastructure and productivity has been 
addressed in a series of recent papers (Aschauer (1989 ); Munnell (1990a) 
and (1990b); Ford and Poret (1991); Berndt and Hansson (1992); Holtz­
Eakin (1992); Easterly and Rebelo (1993) ) .  Although results differ 
according to the methodology and data employed (aggregate or sectoral 
time series, cross-sections for countries or regions and panel for regions) 
and the definition used for the public capital variable, most of the 
evidence gathered suggests a positive relationship between public capital 
and private productivity. The findings of Bajo and Sosvilla (1992) for the 
Spanish case point in the same direction, although no distinction is made 
between public capital as a whole and infrastructure . 
This paper examines the effect of public capital accumulation on 
private-sector productivity in the Spanish economy, with special emphasis 
on the role of public infrastructure . The starting hypothesis is that 
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investment in infrastructure , particularly transportation and 
communications ,  can have a greater effect on private productivity than 
other types of investment (construction of government buildings, for 
example) .  An empirical approach to this question is possible through the 
estimation of production functions in which public infrastructure stock is 
an explanatory variable, using the infrastructure series recently 
constructed by Argimon and Martin (1993) for the Spanish economy. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 highlights certain 
stylised features that characterize the time variations in private-sector 
productivity in the period 1964-1990. Public policy aimed at improving 
infrastructure is among the possible factors that may explain these 
trends. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework . Section 4 begins 
with a brief description of the series used and contains econometric 
estimates of the parameters of an aggregate production function, in which 
infrastructure is an additional input. Finally, Section 5 summarises the 
main findings and tentatively evaluates their possible implications. The 
paper includes two appendices , one on the tests used and the other on 
causality. 
2. PRIVATE-SECTOR PRODUCTIVITY: 1964-1990 
The overall effect of the public sector on private sector production 
cannot be examined without considering the role played by changes in 
private inputs.  One approach to this preliminary analysis is to measure 
the growth of total factor productivity (TFP), i . e .  the growth in 
production that cannot be attributed to increases in capital and labour 
inputs . Growth in TFP will, thus,  reflect both output growth derived 
from greater productive efficiency and changes in any other factor that 
affects the production function and which has not been explicitly taken 
in to account . 
A standard way of calculating the rate of change in TFP in the 
private sector is through the Solow residual, defined as: 
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TFP = �-a� - ( 1-a)� 
Y L K 
(1) 
where Y is private production, L is employment in the private sector, K 
is private productive capital (which excludes stocks and buildings) ,  a 
represents the share of labour earnings in private-sector GDP ( whose 
mean between 1964 and 1990 was about 46%) and the dot indicates variation 
over time . Note that, with a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
constant returns (Y=AKl-cr LO) , the share of labour earnings in GDP 
(wL/Y) would coincide with the labour parameter in this production 
function (a), if this factor is remunerated according to its marginal 
productivity (w= 6Y / 6L), i .  e .  if there is perfect competition. 
Figure 1 shows the rate of change in private-sector TFP (left-hand 
scale) and compares it with the growth rate of private GDP (right-hand 
scale) obtained from annual National Accounts data. Figure 2 shows TFP 
in the private sector and in the economy as a whole . The differences are 
seen to be very small. The range of variation of TFP in the private sector 
is broader than in the overall economy, possibly indicating that, in many 
cases, the public sector has played a compensating role. 
As shown in Figure I, the growth rate of total factor productivity 
for the period 1964-1990 and the growth rate of private GDP follow a very 
similar path. This positive relationship between total productivity and 
GDP, which takes place in the case of Spain, is in contrast to the evidence 
for other countries, where a downward trend in PTF is observed (see 
Englander and Mittelstadt (1988) and Hernando and Valles (1992» , with 
no relation to the performance of GDP growth. In fact, the growth in total 
productivity could be said to have gradually declined between the 1970s 
and the early 1980s. However, once the economy started to recover, TFP 
grew significantly, and it did not fall again until there were clear 
symptoms that the expansive cycle was over. This behaviour of 
productivity holds even if other methods for computing the coefficients 
in (1)  are applied . For instance, if the parameter a is obtained from the 
econometric estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function with 
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constant returns to scale, the time variation in TFP shows the same 
pattern, thus confirming its apparent procyclicality . 
Labour productivity, as reflected in Figure 3 ,  has also followed a 
very similar course to that of private GDP, except for the final years of 
the sample. Since 1985, the growth gap between these two variables has 
widened, with the growth in productivity tending to stabilise at low 
levels . Consequently, a decline in labour productivity is evident during 
the period 1964-1990 . The procyclicality observed in the first part of the 
sample is explained, in the literature on this topic, by the existence of 
technological shocks associated with the cycle , increasing returns or 
labour hoarding . Here again, the lack of a recovery in the growth rate of 
labour productivity in the final period stands out in comparison with the 
evidence of procyclicality in the productivity of labour found for other 
countries (see Hernando and Valles (1992» . 
Capital productivity , whose variation over time is shown in Figure 
4 ,  also changes its pattern of behaviour in the early 1980s. During the 
first few years of the sample , when the economy was steadily growing, the 
contribution of capital was small but, when GDP reduced its growth rate, 
the gap between the two variables narrowed . However, the recovery in 
the growth rate of GDP , which started in 198 1 ,  was accompanied by a 
noteworthy recovery in capital productivity growth. 
To sum up , we have three stylised facts in relation to productivity: 
procyclicality in the growth of TFP throughout the period 1964-1990 
(evidence which contrasts with the systematic decline observed in other 
countries ),  countercyclicality in labour productivity in the 1980s (which 
contrasts with the procyclicality of labour observed in other countries) ,  
and an increase in capital productivity at the end of this period , whereas 
previously the pattern had essentially been one of stability. Therefore , 
a series of stylised features in the performance of the different types of 
productivity can be argued to have consolidated in the 1980s. 
A series of factors evident in past years might partly explain the 
observed change in the behaviour of the productivity of the two inputs . 
First , the public sector made a notable effort to renew and improve the 
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infrastructure stock (see Figure 5 ) .  In fact (see Table 1 ,  column 1),  
government investment has been rising in recent years, reaching around 
5% of GDP. This improvement may have been the driving force behind the 
increase in capital productivity, at a time when the capital/labour ratio 
stood at its lowest values. 
Second, the sharp fall in oil prices in 1986 (Table I, column 2)  
translated into a lower energy bill. The positive supply shock brought 
about by the fall in the price of such an intermediate input could be 
regarded as an element to be taken into account in order to explain these 
stylised events. In particular, the complementarity between energy and 
capital could be the reason for the increase in capital productivity when 
the price of energy declined. 
The opening-up of the Spanish economy, which culminated in 
Spanish EC membership, is another possible explanatory factor (Table 1 ,  
column 3) . Indeed, the stiffer competition arising from this greater 
openness could have prompted the use of more productive technologies in 
order to gain more competitiveness in international markets. Furthermore, 
the foreign direct investment which followed deregulation could have 
provided the impetus (as some studies, such as Ortega's (1992) ,  appear 
to conclude) for the use of more advanced technologies, incorporating 
elements of greater technological progress. 
Finally, the renewal of equipment, which began in 1986, has been 
unparalleled. Real growth rates in equipment investment showed double 
digit figures, reaching 20% in 1987 (Table I, column 4 ) . If this renewal of 
equipment triggered the installation of more productive capital, it may be 
regarded as a possible factor behind the stylised events of the last 
period. This possibility is supported by Hernando and Valles (1992 ) ,  
where the companies which invested more intensely in the substitution of 
capital for labour are shown to have experienced the largest increases in 
TFP. 
The only stylised feature which does not fit with any of the 
aforementioned trends is the countercyclical pattern of the growth rates 
of labour productivity. However, besides its coincidence with the 
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intuitive hypothesis which states that labour productivity should be 
countercyclical (as a result of diminishing marginal productivity) ,  this 
isolated event could be the consequence of job destruction in former 
years, implying that the skills of those entering the labour market in the 
expansive stage were relatively poorer . In fact , it was first-time job 
seekers who fuelled the recovery in employment (see columns 5 and 7 of 
Table 1 )  which, furthermore, was especially strong in temporary 
contracts (Table 1 ,  column 6 ) .  Therefore, there are factors , basically of 
an institutional nature, which can explain why labour productivity showed 
an atypical pattern in Spain. 
To sum up , we have pointed out some stylised events in the final 
part of the sample, such as the acceleration in TFP and in capital 
productivity, and several factors which can account for these events . 
This paper will concentrate on the role played by the public capital stock 
and, in particular , by communications and transportation infrastructure . 
To this end, we will use as our analytical framework an aggregate 
production function which includes public capital as an additional input . 
The following section formally presents this framework . 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The starting point is an aggregate production function such as: 
(2)  
where Y t is aggregate private production of goods and services , Lt is 
aggregate employment in the private sector , K represents public gt 
infrastructure stock, K private productive capital stock and A is a 
� 
t 
measure of technological progress . 
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas 
type: 
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( 3 )  
where: 
(4)  
with g representing the growth rate of exogenous technological progress. 
Taking into account (4), equation (3 ) ,  in its logarithmic version, would 
be 
(5) 
where small case letters denote the variables in logarithms. 
Equation (5) is the relationship whose parameters are sought. 
Reparametrisation yields: 
Therefore, if we estimate: 
(7) 
the lack of statistical significance of the coefficient b 4 will indicate the 
existence of constant returns in all private inputs, including public 
capital. Similarly, to test the existence of constant returns in private 
inputs, the equation to be estimated is: 
(8)  
where the result that the coefficient c4 is  not statistically different from 
zero would indicate the existence of constant returns in private inputs 
(since c4 = a + B - 1 ) .  Note that this implies the existence of increasing 
returns to scale in all inputs, both private and public. 
Generally speaking, the existence of increasing returns to scale 
raises some problems. However, here, it does not, since the level of 
- 13 -
public capital is set by an agent -the government- which finances the 
services entailed in this capital through compulsory revenue (and not by 
charging the cost to potential users). Hence, the private sector does not 
determine the level of public input which, on the contrary, is exogenous. 
In this sense, the equality of private and public capital with respect to 
their marginal productivity net of depreciation does not occur 
automatically. This would happen if there were a planner who would 
optimise social welfare and set the level of public capital so as to bring 
about this equality. 
An alternative approach would be to start from the definition of 
total factor productivity set forth in expression (I) , attempting to explain 
its variations on the basis of a regression such as: 
(9) 
where d is the first-difference operator, and k is the variable of public 
q 
capital. The inclusion of public capital would attempt to reflect the effect 
of this variable on private productivity, although the coefficient obtained 
would no longer have the structural interpretation of the coefficient of 
public capital in the private production function. 
Several theories can suggest which additional variables could be 
used in (9) . First, insofar as the performance of total factor productivity 
is affected by disturbances in demand, the use of capacity utilisation (in 
first differences) would allow the effect of these shocks to be monitored. 
Second, certain theories state that there is some interaction between the 
accumulation of capital and technological progress. Thus, if technological 
progress is incorporated into new capital, we should find that the 
accumulation of capital has a positive effect on productivity (i.e. that in 
using d(k-I) or dk as variables that reflect the renewal of capital goods 
in expression (9) ,  these variables become statistically significant). 
Another theory that takes into account this interactive effect is the 
vintage model, which shows that, if the new capital is more productive 
than the capital already installed, any acceleration in the accumulation of 
capital should be related to increases in productivity (i. e. in (9) the 
-14-
variables 4 '(k-l) or 4 '(k), which measure the acceleration of capital 
accumulation, should be statistically significant: see Wolff (1991) . 
The following section presents the main empirical results obtained 
from both approaches . 
4. PRIVATE PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLIC CAPITAL 
The data base used in the estimation of private production 
functions is MOISEES, at constant 1980 prices, (see Molinas et al. (1990» 
except for the data for private-sector employment, which is the series 
presented in Garcia Perea and G6mez (1993) that is constructed taking 
into account National Accounts criteria. However, the lack of a series of 
transportation and communications infrastructure stock -which is only one 
part of public capital- necessitated the construction of the series. 
A detailed description of the computation of the infrastructure 
figures can be found in Argimon and Martin (1993) .  However, a summary 
of such a description is worthwhile . The main statistical source for the 
construction of these stock series was the General Government Accounts 
(CAP), available from 1958 to 1989, with a much more detailed information 
for the more recent period than for the sixties and seventies. Similarly, 
the volume of information is much larger at the Central Government level 
than for regional and local governments . For the latter, several 
hypotheses had to be applied for the breakdown of public spending into 
transportation and communications infrastructure and other investments 
(given their negligible quantitative importance, Social Security and 
autonomous administrative agencies were not taken into account). The 
stock series is constructed from the real investment series in 
transportation and communications infrastructure, assuming a 5% rate of 
depreciation (the same rate used in Corrales and Taguas (1989) for the 
construction of the public capital series and in the MOl SEES data base) . 
Altogether, four series were calculated: one for General Government, 
based on national accounts (GG(NA»; another for Central Government, 
also in terms of national accounts (CG(NA »; another one for Central 
Government, but in terms of public accounts (CG(PA », (among other 
-15-
differences, this includes defence spending, most of which is recorded 
under public consumption in national accounts);  and a final one for 
Central Government, which, in addition to investment, includes capital 
transfers (CG (PA with KT» . These series not only differ in level but 
also over time (see Argim6n and Martin (1993». 
If the stock series on infrastructure and communications of General 
Government is compared with the public capital series used in the 
MOl SEES model (see Balges, Molinas and Sebastian (1989», 
infrastructure stock is seen to represent around 23% of total public 
capital. If only total capital stock of Central Government and Regional and 
Local Governments is taken into account, transportation and 
communications infrastructure accounts for 38% of the total. The 
quantitative difference between both series and their different qualitative 
components would require the testing of the hypothesis that public 
investment in this type of capital (transportation and communications 
infrastructure) has a noteworthy positive effect on productivity in the 
private sector. 
To this end, we shall estimate the Cobb-Douglas production 
functions which, assuming constant returns to scale, can be expressed 
in logarithms as: 
(10) 
where small case letters denote variables in logarithms, Yt is private GDP 
(calculated as real GDP at factor cost less public labour earnings and 
minus General Government consumption of fixed capital), k is private pt 
capital stock, 1 is employment in the private sector and k is stock of t � 
public capital or of public-sector infrastructure. 
Before interpreting the regression results, which impose constant 
returns to scale for all inputs, it should be noted that estimations were 
made without applying this constraint. The low value (near zero) of the 
coefficients for all Central Government series, as well as the low value of 
their t"ratios, in the regressions which test the existence of constant 
returns in private inputs and in all inputs (equations (7) and (8», 
-16-
support the conclusion that there are constant returns in all inputs .  
However,. for the General Government series, there are signs of 
increasing returns . Nonetheless, when this test for the General 
Government series is performed in an error correction model , estimated 
by non-linear least squares (NLS) , the existence of constant returns 
cannot be rejected . As far as these regressions are concerned , it should 
be borne in mind that , even though the distribution of the coefficients is 
not the standard one, we do know that computed standard errors have , 
in general, a lower value than the true standard errors. A t-ratio below 
2 may, therefore , be an indication of the minor role played by the variable 
whose statistical significance is being questioned. 
Table 2 shows the results obtained from the estimation of equation 
(10) for the different infrastructure series constructed . Two estimations 
are presented, one obtained by OLS and another by non-linear least 
squares (NLS) . The specification of the latter is represented by an error 
correction mechanism (ECM) model, whose general expression is given by : 
4 (y-kp}t = a' + b' 4 (l - kp}t + C'4 (kg - kp}t 
(11) 
+ � ( y -kp}t_,-b" ( l -kp}t_,-c" (kg -kp}t_,]+d4 ( y -kp}t_, 
Appendix I gives the details on the variables used in each of the 
estimated equations . Given the non-stationarity of the data used, 
cointegration statistics are presented. In the estimation by OLS , this 
statistic is the ADF , and in the NLS estimation it is the t-ratio of the ECM 
coefficient (see Appendix I) . 
As Table 2 shows , in all estimations (both for the different series 
and using OLS and NLS) the labour coefficient ranges between 0.2 and 
0.3. With constant returns to scale and perfect competition , the labour 
parameter matches the share of labour in the product. In fact, if each 
factor is remunerated according to its marginal productivity , b, the 
coefficient estimated for (l-k ) should be such that b=(c3Y laL ) ( L/Y}. p 
However, the estimated coefficient is much lower than the share of labour 
earnings in GDP (whose mean is 46% of GDP) . Nonetheless ,  if we consider 
that the product is distributed solely between the two competitive inputs 
- 17 -
TABLE 2 
Private production function with different public infrastructure stock 
1-k , 
k -k , , 
ADF 
DW 
SE 
1-k p 
k -k , p 
ECM 
DW 
SE 
(1964-1989) 
OLS 
Infrastructure variable used 
GC (RA) J CG (HA) I CC (PA, (1) (2) (3) 
0.35 0.22 0.29 
(45.76) (10.86) (28.14) 
0.21 0.60 0.59 
(6.52) (7.74) (8.72) 
-2.38 -3.79 
,. 
-4.14 
0.71 1.28 1.47 
0.016 0.0l4 0.013 
NLS 
Public infrastructure variable used 
GG (RA) CG {RA} I CG (PA) (6, (7) iSl 
0.36 0.20 0.31 
(10.46) (7.52 ) (20.26) 
0.21 0.71 0.59 
(2.63) (8.60) (8.34) 
-0.5 -0.77 .. -0.79 
(-2.79) (-6.00) (-S.S6) •• 
1. 97 2.22 2.30 
0.012 0.08 0.08 
I CG (PAr with 1tT) (f) 
0.30 
(22 .47) 
0.49 
(6.07) 
-2.6 
0.78 
0.017 
I CG (PA, with !tT) (81 
0.27 
(12.05) 
0.67 
(7.30) 
-0.68 •• 
(-5.68) 
2.09 
0.06 
ReQuIte of the estimation of equation (la) by OLS and equation (11) 
by NLS. The values of the coefficients under NLS are those obtained within the 
error correction mechanism and represent long-run relationships. 
� The values in brackets are t-ratioB. The variables are in logarithms. DW is 
the Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test; ADF is the statistical value of t 
in the test of stationarity of the residuals of the estimated equation, 
which is described in Appendix Ii ECM is the estimated value of e in 
equation (11), whose significance is interpreted as a cointegration test, 
as explained in Appendix I, which also lists the variables included in the 
short term of each equation estimated; SE is the standard error of the 
regression. 
** 5\ level of significance. 
* 10\ level of significance. 
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(labour and private capital) ,  since public capital is not remunerated in 
relation to its marginal productivity , then labour's share in output -
calculated as the ratio between the labour coefficient (c in equation (10» 
and the sum of c and the private capital coefficient (l-c-b) - rises to 44%, 
according to the figures in column (1 ) .  The main difference between the 
results of the NLS and OLS estimations is that the public capital 
coefficient obtained under NLS is generally higher than that obtained 
through OLS. With respect to the fit obtained with the different series 
constructed, the General Government stock series has the most 
unsatisfactory results (in relation to the cointegration tests) .  
The most remarkable result in Table 2 is that, for all series, the 
productivity of public infrastructure capital is higher than that of the 
private sector. In addition, the Central Government infrastructure series 
constructed according to the public accounting criterion, and including 
capital transfers, presents a worse fit than the series which does not 
include capital transfers . 
As far as comparison of the national and the public accounting 
series of Central Government infrastructure is concerned , the estimated 
coefficients ,  the fit of the equation and the ADF and ECM statistics are 
very similar to each other (columns (2 ) ,  (3), (6) and (7» . It should be 
recalled that the public accounting series includes defence spending, 
whereas national accounts does not . The only remarkable difference in the 
estimation is that the labour coefficient is, in the case of the public 
accounting series , somewhat higher ( 0 . 29 compared with 0 . 22 in the OLS 
estimation) .  In both cases, it is very low since under the hypothesis of 
perfect competition and constant returns, this coefficient should match 
the participation of wages in private GDP. As earlier mentioned , one 
possible explanation for this low value may lie in the nature of public 
capital , whose level is determined by the public sector, and cannot be 
controlled by the private one, nor is it remunerated according to its 
marginal productivity . In this sense , if the private labour and capital 
coefficients of columns 1 to 3 in Table 2 are again compared (i . e .  if the 
labour coefficient is compared with the sum of the coefficients for private 
labour and capital) , labour would have a relative participation of 44% when 
the General Government series is used (compared with 56% for private 
- 19 -
capital) , 55% with the Central Government-national accounts series and 
74% with the Central Government-public accounts series . In any event , 
this low value of the labour coefficient is in line with the results obtained 
when the public capital series is used (see Bajo and Sosvilla (1992» . It 
should be pointed out that the output elasticity of public capital is lower 
for the Central Government-national accounts series, which does not 
include military spending, than for the Central Government-public 
accounts series . 
One of the contributions of this paper is the use of an 
infrastructure series as the relevant public capital variable . Thus , we 
can compare the results obtained from the series of public infrastructure 
stock with the ones which only consider public capital as a whole, without 
distinguishing between its different components . We will estimate the 
production function presented in equations (10) and (11 ) ,  but including 
the rest of public capital as an additional regressor£l) . This regression 
enables the test of the preliminary hypothesis that, first, the distinction 
between public investment in infrastructure and in the rest of public 
capital is relevant; and, second , that public infrastructure is more 
productive than the rest of public sector capital. As may be seen in Table 
3, in all the regressions the coefficient of the rest of public capital (r -k ) 
• • 
is very close to zero, with the exception of the General Government 
series . The empirical evidence for this series is not conclusive because 
whereas the OLS estimation would evidence that this coefficient is very 
close to zero , the NLS estimation would support the conclusion that the 
coefficient for the rest of public capital is the same as that for public 
infrastructure. Once again , it is the General Government series which has 
the worst results in relation to the cointegration tests . 
To sum up , the empirical evidence reflected in Table 3 shows that 
not only the output elasticity to public infrastructure is higher than the 
output elasticity to the rest of public capital , but also that the rest of 
(1) The public capital series is constructed according to the same 
criteria and for the same agents used in the construction of the 
infrastructure series . 
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TABLB 3 
Private production function with infra8tructure stock and all other 
public stock 
(1964-1989) 
01.5 
Infrastructure variable 
GG (RA) 
(1) 
1-k 0.38 , 
(19.33) 
k -k 0.17 , , 
(3.84) 
r -k 0.04 , , 
(1.47) 
AD. 2.67 
DW 0.86 
SE 0.016 
GC (HA) 
(S) 
1-k 0.41 , 
(10.92) 
k -k 0.11 , , 
(1.42) 
r -k 0.10 , , 
(2.19) 
ECM -0.67 
(3.58) 
DW 2.03 
SE 0.011 
rg : All other public capital 
** 5\ level of significance. 
* 10\ level of significance. 
See note to Table 2. 
CG (RA) 
(2) 
0.21 
(9.77) 
0.62 
(7.78) 
-0.01 
(0.98) 
3.71 
1. 31 
0.015 
NLS 
ex; (HA) 
(6) 
0.20 
(6.30) 
0.71 
(7.70) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.77 .. 
(5.71) 
2.20 
0.008 
- 21-
ueed 
CG (PAl CG 
(PA, with KT) 
(3) (4) 
0.27 0.45 
(IS. 59) (4.92) 
0.65 0.26 
(8.49) (1.55) 
-0.03 0.12 
(1.50) (1.66) 
.. 
4.57 2.61 
1.65 0.76 
0.013 0.017 
OG (PAl CG 
(PAr with KT) 
(7) (8) 
0.32 0.36 
(13.55) (4.36) 
0.56 0.51 
(6.33) (3.22) 
0.02 0.069 
(0.67) (1.16) 
-0.78 -0.71 .. .. 
(5.38) ( 5.81) 
2.35 2.12 
0.009 0.008 
public capital does not appear to affect productivity in the private sector, 
either positively or negatively . This result could be interpreted as 
indicating that this part of public capital (which includes , among other 
elements, government buildings ) can be regarded more as an element of 
public consumption than as productive capital. 
Another finding in Table 2 which, in principle, is not satisfactory 
is the bad fit (in terms of cointegration tests) of the estimation of the 
production function when the General Government series is used, 
compared with the good fit of this function when the series constructed 
for the Central Government are used. Looking for the possible causes of 
this result , we conducted stability tests for the equation , and also 
analysed, separately , the series on General Government , Central 
Government (national accounts) and Regional and Local Governments 
(taken as the difference between the two) , with the results presented in 
Table 4 .  As can be seen, they evidence the existence , in the General 
Government series, of a structural break in 1985, when the transfer of 
powers to regional governments was intensified and consolidated. In 
particular, the output elasticity to the Regional and Local Government 
series seems to indicate the irrelevance of these infrastructure systems 
to private sector productivity . 
Table 5 presents the results obtained when the production function 
is estimated separating Central Government infrastructure from that of 
Regional and Local Governments . It shows that both estimations - the one 
including the joint infrastructure stocks and the estimation including only 
Regional and Local Government infrastructure - evidence that territorial 
government infrastructure apparently does not affect productivity in the 
private sector . 
To sum up , the overall evidence reflected in Tables 4 and 5 
confirms that the bad fit of the General Government series stems from the 
different output elasticity to Central Government and to Regional and 
Local Government infrastructure , the latter not seeming significantly to 
affect private-sector productivity. The rationale for this apparent 
irrelevance of territorial infrastructure with respect to productivity in 
the private sector may be twofold . First of all, it could be the 
- 22-
TABLE 4 
Structural change in the production function 
General Central Regional and 
Government Government Local Government 
(1) I (2) ( 1) I ( 2) ( 1) I ( 2) 
1985 0.67 3.25 -- 0.71 1.38 0.07 0.32 
(4.12) (3.11) ( 7 . 10) (3 . 11 ) (0.63) (3.11) 
1989 0.21 - 0.71 - 0.02 -
(2.83 ) (8.60) (0.67) 
The first column of the table shows the last year of the sample used for the 
estimation of the function: 
& (y -kp) t = 00 +01& (l-kp)" +a2[ (y -kp) t-) -oJ(l-kp) t-I -04 (kq -kp) t-l ]+as& (y -kp) t-l 
Column (1) presents the estimated value of Cl4' and, in brackets, the t 
statistic. column (2) shows the value of the F test of structural change, and, 
in parenthesis, the critical value at the 5\ level of significance. 
5\ level of significance. 
TABLE 5 
Role of infrastructure stock of Regional and Local Governments 
( 1) I ( 2) 
NLS 
( l-kp ) 0 .46 0.21 
(9.84) (7.12) 
(ktt-kpl 0.02 0.007 
(0.67) (0.88) 
(k.-kp) -
0.67 
- (7.23 ) 
ECM -0.30 -0 . 82 --
(-2.08) (-5.77) 
R' 0.697 0.868 
SE 0.012 0.008 
Results of the estimation by non-linear least squares of the equation: 
& (y-kp)t =00 +a l & (i-kp) t +O2[ (y-kp) t_I-Ol(l-kp)t_1 -04 (ktt -kp)t_l -Qs(k. -kp) t_.].+a6& (y-kp)t_l 
where Os has been assumed to be zero in column (1). 
The values of the coefficients are those obtained within the error correction 
mechanism. ECM is the value of the coefficient (12' 
ktt: logarithm of infrastructure stock of regional and Local Governments. 
ke: logarithm of Central Government infrastructure stock. 
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consequence of measurement errors in the General Government variable 
(in its Regional and Local Government component) .  In fact, the statistical 
sources available for regional and local public finances (incomplete and 
less detailed) , the exclusion of Social Security spending in infrastructure 
(with little relevance in this case) and of autonomous government agencies 
(with a low level of investment but unquestionably higher than in the case 
of Social Security) , can lead to measurement errors in the overall General 
Government variable which would affect the result obtained . 
Second , this result may also be warranted by the transfer of 
powers to regional governments in the 80s . Indeed, the instability 
observed since 1985 in the General Government series is a reflection of the 
finding that the output elasticity to the infrastructure investment of 
Regional Governments is lower than that of Central Government . 
Moreover, both the different nature of the goods in which Regional 
Governments invest and the possible lower efficiency in the use of 
resources, due to their relative management inexperience , may lead to the 
different estimated output elasticities . However , the analysis does not 
provide for the separation of these possible explanations which, as a 
result, are tentative and , therefore , must be interpreted with caution. 
Finally, the results obtained under the TFP approach, which 
implies the estimation of equation (9)  by OLS, are found in Table 6 .  As 
can be seen, we have gathered evidence that the capital utilisation ratio 
(lcu, which captures the existence of demand shocks) and public 
infrastructure stock (with the series for General Government and national 
and public accounts Central Government ) play an important role in 
explaining variations in total factor productivity. In contrast, the theory 
of interaction between capital accumulation and technological progress was 
not empirically confirmed in either of its two versions . Thus, the variable 
<1(k-l) was neither significant nor did it have the proper sign . The same 
can be said of the vintage effect . A test of the interaction between capital 
and technological progress with the variables <1k and <1'k was attempted, 
with negative results in both cases J since they did not prove to be 
statistically significant . 
-24-
TABLE 6 
TFP approach 
ExoqenOUB v. GC (HA) J CC (HA) I ex; (PA) 
• k 0.12 0.13 0.11 gt.·l (3.19) (2.89) (2.90) 
• leu 
, 
0.30 0.31 0.31 
(3.23) (3.25 ) (3.25 ) 
R' 0.39 0.36 0.36 
SE 0.012 0.012 0.012 
DW 1.84 1.69 1.71 
Results of the estimation of the equation: 
t statistics in brackets; R2, determination coefficient; SE, standard error 
of the regression; OW, Ourbin-Wataon statistic. 
Th� performance of the three series is very similar , as evidenced 
in the last three columns of Table 6 .  In fact , the coefficient for 
infrastructure, when one period tag is included , ranges between 0.13 and 
0 . 11, and the fit of the equation , measured by the standard error, is the 
same in all three cases (0.012). This makes it difficult to decide in favour 
of any of the three specifications . It should be recalled that the evaluation 
of these results is not the same as when a production function is 
estimated, since in the productivity approach there is no structural 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients . Furthermore , the analysis of 
total productivity, as reflected in Table 6 ,  implies estimating in 
differences , whereas the production function approach leads to an 
estimation in levels . 
Therefore , the results of these regressions support the positive 
interaction between public infrastructure capital and productivity in the 
private sector . However , given the lack of evidence of a relationship 
between capital accumulation and technological progress (which 
contradicts the empirical findings available for other countries : see Wolff 
(1991» , these results should be viewed as preliminary . 
-25 -
In short , the construction of a series of public infrastructure stock 
allowed for the test of its effect on private-sector productivity . . A 
substantial positive effect is observed, higher than in the rest of public 
capital ( which, in fact ,  does not seem to affect productivity in the private 
sector) . Furthermore , the output elasticity to investment in 
infrastructure is higher than the elasticity to private productive capital. 
However, the output elasticity to public capital in infrastructure is rather 
high, although in line with the results of similar studies in other countries 
(see Munnell ( 1990a) and Table 7) . Nonetheless, it should be recalled that 
the stochastic characteristics of the time series used (their 
non-stationarity) invalidate the use of standard errors to analyze the 
distribution of the estimated parameters . Therefore , the output elasticity 
to infrastructure may not be significantly different from that of private 
capital. 
The two Central Government series based on national and public 
accounts produce the best fit of the four infrastructure series 
considered . Even though the better result of the Central Government 
series can be explained by the existence of measurement errors in the 
General Government variable, the increasing share of Regional and Local 
Governments in public investment, including spending on infrastructure, 
implies that the relatively worse behaviour of this General Government 
series is one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the empirical evidence 
gathered . Although there are several possible explanations for the 
problems of stability arising in the use of this series, these results should 
be regarded as provisional and require a more detailed study of the 
potential problems hidden behind such instability. 
Finally, the TFP approach provides further evidence of the 
relationship between public infrastructure capital and private 
productivity . Unlike the production function approach, there are no 
apparent differences between the series , either in the estimated 
coefficients or in the fit of the equations, as regards their explanatory 
power for the variations in total factor productivity. 
A frequent criticism of this literature is that the observed empirical 
relationship between infrastructure and private investment may be the 
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result of a reversed causality scheme, whereby a higher level of 
development entails higher infrastructure spending. Appendix 2 contains 
the causality tests performed, which support the result that the direction 
of causality is the expected one: an increase in public transportation and 
communications infrastructure increases (causes) productivity in the 
private sector. 
5 .  CONCLUSIONS 
Private-sector productivity in Spain exhibits features 
distinguishing it from observations in other countries. In particular, in 
the boom period which began in 1985, there was an acceleration in total 
factor productivity (TFP), i. e. in that part of the product which is not 
attributable to mere increases in the quantities of the labour factor or 
private productive capital. 
This paper has attempted to ascertain which part of the recent 
variation in this residual factor can be explained by trends in public 
transportation and communications infrastructure. The observed 
acceleration of TFP has taken place at the same time as a stronger public 
investment drive centered, to a large extent, on the renewal of 
transportation and communications infrastructure. 
The estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function for the 
private sector, which includes infrastructure stock as an additional 
input, results in not being able to reject the hypothesis that public 
infrastructure played an important role in the acceleration of TFP. In line 
with the available international evidence, the output elasticity of public 
infrastructure is much higher than the output elasticity of private 
productive capital, a comparison which holds even when possible omitted 
variables are included or when the regression is run by subsamples. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that the output elasticity of public 
infrastructure is much higher than the output elasticity with respect to 
overall public capital (which includes, in addition to infrastructure, other 
investment such as government buildings, etc.) . Finally, we find that the 
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direction of causality is the expected one, i . e .  the observed relationship 
does not result from a higher level of development being necessarily 
accompanied by a higher demand for public spending in infrastructure . 
As to the comparison of these results with the existent empirical 
literature on the subject, the elasticity of output to infrastructure 
obtained in this paper can be observed to lie in the upper band of the 
estimations found in other countries ( see Table 7 ) .  However, it is similar 
to the elasticity estimated in studies that use time series at a national 
level. The lower value of the output elasticity obtained in other works 
that use more disaggregated data ( states , regions, towns) may be due to 
the loss of the externality effect which public capital at a regional level 
has on private productivity in other regions . Moreover, the definition of 
infrastructure employed in those studies is broader than the one used in 
this paper, thus possibly affecting the estimation of the elasticity of 
output to public infrastructure. Whereas many studies are based on 
public capital as a whole, or take all public capital into consideration 
except defence spending, this paper sets public investment in 
T ..... 7 
•• tlmation. of the el •• ticity of output to public capital 
Author Level of Specification Elasticity 
Aggregation 
Aachauer (1989) National CObb-Douglas. levels, ,,,,,. . 39/.56 
Holtz-Sakin (1988) National cobb-Douglas, levela. ,,,,,. . 3' 
Munnell ( 1990a) National CObb-Dou9Ias, levels. ,,,,,. .3' 
COllta e t  a1. _l1987} States Transloq, level. .20 
Bianer (1991) States Cobb-Douglas, levels, '",,8 .17  
Hera (1973) Regions of Japan Cobb-Douglall, levels, logs . 2 0  
Hunnell ( 1990b) States CObb-Douglaa, levels, ,,,,,. .15 
Holtz-Eakin (1992) States CObb-Douqlall, levels. ,,,,,. . 20/0 
Eberts (1986) , (1990) T�' TranslOQ, levels .03 
Argim6n et a l .  ( 1993) National CObb-Douglaa, levels, ,,,,,. . 60 
Source : Hunnell (1992 ) .  
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transportation and communications infrastructure apart from the rest of 
public capital. 
Several elements may explain a possible upward bias in the 
estimation of the output elasticity. First, the true rate of depreciation of 
private capital may be closer to the rate assumed for public capital (5% in 
our case) than to the one used to construct private capital stock (l0% in 
our case) . Under such hyphotesis, the public capital stock used could be 
a better measure of private capital than the private capital stock itself 
and, therefore the estimation would give excessive weight to public 
capital. Second, a strong correlation could exist between infrastructure 
investment and another variable that should have been included in the 
estimated model, but which was omitted (due to measuring problems, 
misspecification, etc . ) .  Such correlation would lead to an overestimation 
of the public infrastructure coefficient. This could be the case if the 
excluded variable were human capital, since infrastructure investment 
can be very collinear with public spending in human capital (education, 
health, etc. ),  and it would imply that infrastructure stock would also be 
reflecting the potential role of human capital in private-sector 
productivity. 
Figure 6 shows the time variation in total factor productivities 
calculated as the residuals of a Cobb-nouglas production function for the 
private sector. Constant returns to scale are assumed in both 
specifications and that the sole inputs are, either private productive 
capital and labour (TFP), or these two inputs plus Central Government 
public infrastructure (TFP without the contribution of public capital) . As 
it can be seen, the inclusion of public infrastructure iil the production 
function reduces the range of variation in growth rates, in such a way 
that the economic downward turn observed between 1975 and 198 2 ,  as well 
as the upward turn which took place after 1983 , are less intense. 
Moreover, when the public variable is taken into account the annual path 
of TFP performance, which reflects the existence of supply and/or 
demand shocks of a permanent nature, is not affected. 
In line with the empirical evidence gathered for other countries, 
the results point out at the relevance of the distinction between current 
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public expenditure and capital expenditure as far as the study of the 
impact of budgetary policy is concerned . Moreover, the distinction drawn 
between public investment as a whole and investment in transportation 
and communications infrastructure highlights that not only the breakdown 
of public spending by current expenditure and capital investment is 
important , but that the breakdown of public investment by infrastructure 
and other types of investment is also relevant. 
The positive effects of public infrastructure investment on 
private-sector productivity suggest some tentative policy conclusions . 
First, the process of budget consolidation undertaken in order to meet the 
requirements for joining the Economic and Monetary Union should not 
imply a reduction of public spending in infrastructure , as has occurred 
in recent years . Even more important , given the positive impact on 
productivity of this type of expenditure , any policy aimed at improving 
the competitiveness of the economy will have to ensure that budgetary 
consolidation is compatible with public investment efforts in the area of 
infrastructure( 2 )  . 
( 2 )  Moreover, the empirical evidence gathered in an ongoing study 
allows us to conclude, at least provisionally , that the crowding-out effect 
of public investment on private investment is negligible if not irrelevant, 
in the case of Spain . In other studies with a different conceptual 
framework , however, there are hidications that this crowding-out effect 
is, in the long run, absolute (see Argim6n and Roldan 1991 » .  
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APPENDIX I :  
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TESTS USED 
ADF test 
Given a time series xt' the ADF test is a test on the statistical 
significance of L\ in the regression: 
o 
4Xt = 1\xt_1 + E Y j 4. xt-j 
j-l 
where n is such that the regression residuals are white noise. 
The null hypothesis that x, is a first-order integrated series 
( x - I ( l »  cannot be rejected, if we cannot reject that B=O. Conversely, if 
B . O ,  then x, is said to be stationary ( x, -I(O» . If the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, it must then be tested whether B' is different from 
zero in the regression : 
o
· 
,6,2Xt = 6 ' ,6,  xt-1 + E V; ,6,2 Xt-j 
j "'l 
If B'.O, x, is said to be a first-order integrated series. If the null 
hypothesis that the series is 1(2)  (B'=O cannot be rejected) , then, 
likewise, it must be tested whether xt is an integrated series of order 
three , as opposed to order two . 
When the ADF test is used as a cointegration test it is performed on 
the residuals of the estimated long run relationship . McKinnon ( 1990) 
gives critical values of the t statistic that is needed for our tests on L\ ,  
since J under the null hypothesis , the t statistic does not have the 
standard distribution . Critical values vary with sample size and with the 
presence or absence of a constant or a trend . When this test is used as a 
cointegration test, the critical values also vary with the number of 
variables included in the regression which gives rise to the residual xt' 
as well as with the inclusion or exclusion of a time trend in the 
cointegration relationship . 
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The critical values for a sample of 26 data (1964 to 1989) are: 
Size of the test 
5% 10% 
One variable 
without constant -1 . 95 -1 . 62 
constant - 2 . 98 -2 . 63 
constant and trend - 3 . 59 - 3 . 23 
Three cointegration variables 
constant -4 . 08 - 3 . 69 
constant and trend -4 . 60 -4 . 1 9  
Four cointegration variables 
constant -4 .54 -4.14  
constant and trend -5 . 02 -4.59 
Source : McKinnon (1990) . 
A summary of the res\\1ts of the ADF test for the different series 
used may be found in Table A . l  . 
ECM test 
Because of its simplicity, the cointegration test based on the ADF 
statistic raises the problem of imposing common factor restrictions , which 
have not been tested. Such limitation can reduce the power of tms test in 
relation to others . In this sense, the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficient of the error correction term in an Error Correction 
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( y  - kp l t.  
( 1  - kp l t. 
( \-kp l t.  
GG (NA) 
CG (NA) 
CG ( PA )  
CG ( PA ,  with 
GG (MOISEES l 
KT) 
TABLE A . I  
Tests of unit roots 
I ( O )  1 ( 1 )  
X 
x' 
X 
X 
X 
x' 
All variables are in logarithm s .  
( a )  At the 1 0 %  level o f  significance. 
1 ( 2 )  
X 
Mechanism (ECM) representation of the model is a more powerful test than 
the ADF statistics. 
The ECM cointegration test is based on the statistical significance 
of B in the regression: 
k k 
4Yt = ao + a1 E AX1t + B [Yt-1 - Cl E Xit_1] 1 1 
where Y t. is the variable to be explained , Xi are the explanatory k 
variables , ci are the coefficients of the cointegration relationship , and the 
constant (the mean) of the long-run relationship is recovered as the mean 
value of the expression in brackets . A more formal development , as well 
as the critical values for this test, may be found in Banerjee, Dolado and 
Mestre ( 1993 ) ,  where this same relationship is estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) through the specification of an unrestricted dynamic 
model. 
The ECM representation can also be interpreted as a specification 
of the dynamic relationship between the different variables . The long-run 
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relationship is represented by the expresion in brackets and the 
coefficients a1 give us the short-run relationships. 
The regression results for the different definitions of the variables 
and the different specifications may be found in part in the tables , under 
the heading of non-linear least squares (NLS ) .  The estimated values for 
c, appear in this part of the different tables . The line ECM shows the 
value for B and its t-ratio. In all cases, the test required the inclusion of 
the lag in the variable to be explained, as an additional regressor. 
Likewise, for the results in Tables 2 ,  3 and 4 ,  the public infrastructure 
variable was not included in the short run, since it was not statistically 
different from zero . 
For a sample size of 25, the critical values are: 
Size of the test 
5% 10% 
Three cointegration variables 
constant - 3 . 64 - 3 . 24 
constant and trend -4 . 18 -3 . 72 
Four cointegration variables 
constant - 3 . 91 - 3 . 46 
constant and trend -4 . 18 - 3 . 7 2  
Source : Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre ( 1993 ) .  
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APPENDIX 11: CAUSALITY 
If two series are cointegrated then causality must exist, at least in 
one of the two possible directions (Granger ( 1988 » .  However, 
beforehand , an exogeneity test must be performed: it will allow us to 
determine whether the variables in the model , and whose causality is not 
being tested , are exogenous .  
1 .  Checking exogeneity: 
The exogeneity check is formulated as a Hausman specification test. 
Given that the model includes an error correction mechanism (ECM), a 
test must be performed to determine whether this mechanism helps to 
explain the behaviour of the variables (Charemza and Deadman ( 1992 » .  
In this case, the test entails including the previously estimated 
error correction mechanism among the instruments which are used to 
construct the Vector Autoregressive for each explanatory variable z . pt 
The estimation is based on the regression : 
j q j j j 
L L ap1Azpt-1 + L Bi4Xt-1 + L A,14Yt-1 + L Yi ecmt-1 (1) 
where xt and Y t are the variables whose causality relationship is being 
tested and ecmt is the error correction mechanism. If the null hypothesis 
for the ecm coefficient in the equation of each of the explanatory variables 
cannot be rejected, then the residuals of equation ( 1 )  for these variables 
are calculated , with the ECM omitted. The statistical significance of these 
residuals in the model equation is tested . It is formulated as an F test with 
k2 -k1 , T-k2 degrees of freedom, where T is the number of observations 
and kl and k2 are the number of parameters estimated in the restricted 
model and in the unrestricted version (which includes the residuals ) ,  
respectively. In the event that the null hypothesis that the variables are 
exogenous cannot be rejected, they would appear contemporaneously in 
the ECM equation and , consequently, in the causality test . 
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2. Causality test 
Once exogeneity has been determined , a causality direction test 
based on Granger ( 1969) is built. The causality equation , in the event 
that we wish to check whether x causes y ,  is specified as : 
j q 
a1dxt-1+L Ebp1A. zpt-1+1 + 
1""1 po;]. 
j j 
L e! 4Yt-1 + E d1 ecmt-1 
i-t 1=1 
( 2 )  
where b , ,,,,"0 ,  if and only if z is exogenous , and ecm is the previously p p 
estimated error correction mechanism. 
It is a test on the overall significance of the coefficients 81 and d! 
and is formulated as an F with k2 -k1 , T-kz degrees of freedom, where T 
is , again, the number of observations , and kl and k2 are the number of 
parameters estimated under the restricted (a1=d1=O) and unrestricted 
models , respectively. Likewise, the t statistics can be used as a criterion. 
3. Results 
Table A .  2 shows the results of the tests performed in order to 
determine the exogeneity of (i-k) , carried out for each of the 
infrastructure variables. Only one lag of each of the variables was 
included . The error correction mechanism used as a regression was 
obtained from the non-linear least squares estimation of the entire 
dynamics, as reflected in the results presented in Table 3 ,  i .  e .  the 
variable ecm, which is included in the exogeneity and causality tests , is 
obtained by estimating an equation of the type : 
and setting 
4 (y-kp) t  = ao + a,4 (i-kp) t  + a,4 (y-kp) t-1 + 
+ a3 [(y-kp)t_1-a.( i-kp)t_1-ft5 (kg-kp) t_1] 
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As Table A .  2 shows, it seems that in no case can the null 
hypothesis be rejected. Therefore , in the causality test , the explanatory 
variable l-k should appear contemporaneously. 
The causality test resulted in the figures presented in Table A .  3 .  
which shows the values of the relevant coefficients and their respective 
t-ratios.  In particular, under the columns labelled ( 1 ) , the causality 
direction runs from infrastructure stock to productivity, and, under the 
columns labelled ( 2 ) , the direction runs from productivity to 
infrastructure. The conclusions that can be reached from these results 
are that infrastructure affects productivity, whereas there is no evidence 
that variations in productivity generate changes in infrastructure . 
General 
Central 
Central 
Central 
TABLE A . 2  
Bxogeneity tests 
Infrastructure series 
Government (GG (NA) ) 
Government ( NA )  
Government ( PA )  
Government ( PA )  + transfers 
F = 
Sl-S2/k2-kl 
S, / T -k, 
0 . 71 
( 4 . 38 )  
2 . 63 
( 4 . 38 )  
4 . 22 
( 4 . 38 )  
3 . 29 
( 4 . 38 )  
I n  brackets i s  the value o f  F at the 5 \  level o f  significance. 1 , 1 9  
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TABLE 11..3 
Teat of causality direction 
GG (NA) I CG INA) I CO (PA) I CG (PA) • 'T 
( 1 (  I ( 2 )  I ( 1 )  I ( 2 )  I ( 1 )  I ( 2 )  I ( 1 )  I ( 2 )  
" 0 . 23 -0. 002 - 0 . 0 4  - 0 . 3 1  0 . 12 -0.40 -0.06 - 0 . 2 6  
( 1 .  44) ( 0 . 01 ) ( 0 . 2 5  ) ( 1 .  3 0 )  ( 0 . 8 3 )  ( 1 .  44) ( 0 . 32 J ( 1 . 17 ) 
" -0 . 36 - 0 . 2 2  - 0 . 8 1  0 . 7 9  -0.68 0 . 8 3  - 0 . 7 4  0 . 4 6  
( 2 . 29)  ( 0 . 8 3 )  ( 4 . 13 ) ( 2 . 04)  ( 3 . 6 5  ) ( 2 . 10 )  ( 3 . 8 7 )  ( 1 .  2 9 )  
F 8 . 2 6  .. 1 .  63 2 5 . 6 2  
. . 
2 . 49 25.88 . . 2 . 4 0  2 4 . 4 5  . .  1 . 73 
Reaulta of the eatimation of the equation 
where y�.(y-kp)�  Y x.=(k9-kp).  in column ( 1 ) .  and the oppoaite in column ( 2 ) .  
The values of the coeffi�ient. g) and a�, and their respective t-rati09 are shown, a s  well as 
the F teat of the overall signif ic:anc:e of al and a� . The value of this test at the 5\ level of 
aiqnlficanc:e ia 3 . 5 5 .  
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